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Whenever a search for a new Supreme Court justice begins, so does the inevitable
political rhetoric that surrounds such affairs. Politicians and pundits alike warn of
nominees who intend to "legislate from the bench," rather than observe a judicial
philosophy that embodies "strict construction." Behind this rhetoric lies a simple truth
liberals prefer liberal nominees and conservatives prefer conservatives. But, as both
books reviewed in this essay reveal, from very different perspectives, ideology and
activism are theoretically independent concepts, despite the tendency of some to conflate
them. And, unlike the rhetorical public battles, the authors of these books provide
thoughtful evidence about the nature of judicial activism as well as public perceptions of
what we expect from our judges. Taken together, these two seemingly different books
provide important insights into the actual, on-Court behavior of Supreme Court justices
as well as Americans' expectations of that behavior. Moreover, both books offer firstrate examples of how empirical, quantitative work on law and courts can and should
inform normative debates regarding the way we select judges and what we expect from
them once they are confirmed to the Court.
In their book, Measuring Judicial Activism, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Frank B.
Cross set out to measure the extent of judicial activism on the Supreme Court.1 Toward
that end, they provide a workable definition of activism as well as an empirical strategy
for measuring it.2 As they note, while politicians and pundits are quick to utter the phrase
"activist," and legal scholars spend a great deal of time thinking and fretting about how it
relates to the counter-majoritarian problem, considerably less attention has been devoted
* Associate Professor, Arizona State University.
1. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, MeasuringJudicialActivism (Oxford U. Press
2009).
2. Id. at 133-149.
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to defining and measuring activism. 3 Moreover, while many people have a particular
Supreme Court justice in mind as personifying judicial activism, it is often based on
nothing more than ideological disagreement with that justice. Thus, Lindquist and Cross
set out to create empirically testable measures of judicial activism and to apply that to the
behavior of Supreme Court justices in an attempt to assess to whom the label
appropriately applies.-4
The second book reviewed in this essay, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations:
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People by James L. Gibson and

Gregory A. Caldeira, examines public perceptions of nominee Samuel Alito during the
confirmation process as well as how the intense confirmation battle affected the Court's
institutional legitimacy.5 Although these books appear, at first blush, to tackle very
different subjects and employ very different research strategies, they share a very
important common underlying assumption - that American citizens, scholars, and policy
makers have certain expectations about what makes for a good judge and how judges
should behave while on the bench. Central to that assumption is that judges should
understand that their role is to render decisions on cases and to avoid "legislating from
the bench." While a thorough summary of the findings of both books is beyond the scope
of this essay, I do provide a brief overview of the main research questions, analytic
strategies, and empirical findings of both books. The primary focus of this essay,
however, is to explain how each book furthers our understanding of the role of judicial
activism on the Supreme Court and public perceptions of judicial activism.
DEFINING AND MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

As mentioned previously, the Lindquist and Cross book uses data from the actual
behavior of Supreme Court Justices to provide the first comprehensive, systematic look
at activism among Supreme Court Justices.6 While there is a substantial body of research
on the nature of ideological voting among Supreme Court justices, there has only been a
smattering of empirical research on activism as separate from judicial preferences. One
obstacle to the development of this research has been the lack of consensus over a
workable definition. While Lindquist and Cross agree that ideology is an element of
activism (in that judges may engage in activist behavior to achieve ends consistent with
their judicial preferences), they insist that any definition must have some operational
definition beyond the observer's dislike of an outcome. 7 Sadly, as they note, this bias
plagues not just popular work, but scholarly work as well.8
In devising empirically testable measures, Lindquist and Cross survey the nonempirical literature to extract some common understanding of the elements of judicial
activism. The elements they find include: 1) deference to other branches of government,
2) legal stability, 3) institutional aggrandizement, and 4) results orientation/policy
3. Id. at 1-28.
4. Id. at 138.
5. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts and Confirmations:Positivity Theory andthe
Judgments of the American People (Princeton U. Press 2009).

6. See Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
7. Id. at 29-46.
8. Id. at 9-14, 21-24.
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making. To create operational definitions, they define activism as ruling federal and
state laws as unconstitutional, overturning executive agency decisions, and the reversal
of precedent.1 0 These are straightforward and have appeared in some other empirical
research. More novel to the study of activism is the inclusion of Supreme Court decisions
opening access to courts as an indicator of activism. 1 1 In particular, they include rulings
to expand the set of justiciable cases since it represents an attempt at institutional
aggrandizement.12
For each of these indicators of activism, the authors evaluate how individual
justices from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts vary in the degree to which they
engage in the various forms of activism.1 3 In addition, they also present data on
aggregate Court behavior dating back to the Fuller Court. 14 The individual level data is
further parsed into what they refer to as institutional or ideological activism.15
Institutional activism is simply the frequency with which a justice engages in the activist
behavior over all cases and ideological activism is the degree to which the justices
engage in the behavior in pursuit of a specific ideological outcome.16 From those two
dimensions, they create a two-dimensional measure where justices can be high on both,
low on both, or high on one but low on another. 17
Each chapter evaluates a single indicator of activism (overturning federal laws,
overturning state laws, overturning executive agencies, etc.) among the different Courts
and justices.18 Each chapter follows the same basic formula of analyzing the activism of
the different courts over time first, and then they turn their attention to the behavior of
the individual justices. 19 In the final empirical chapter, the authors create a composite
measure of activism by creating an additive scale of the individual indicators analyzed in
previous chapters. 20
The empirical results confirm some prior wisdom (i.e., Frankfurter exhibits the
most restrained behavior across most dimensions of activism, and Douglas exhibits some
of the most activist behavior across the dimensions).21 However, some results prove
more surprising. For example, while the top activists tend to be liberal justices, in the
aggregate measure of activism, Justice Clarence Thomas is the sixth most activist justice
in the sample.22 He follows on the heels of Justices Brennan and Marshall.23 While that
may not be too surprising to many scholars of judicial behavior, it must be a surprise to
conservative proponents who constantly bemoan judicial activism when it comes from
9. Id. at 133.
10. Id. at 135.

11. Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1, at 105-120, 135.
12. Id. at 105-120.
13. See generally id.
14. Id. at 50, 71.

15. Id. at 63, 81, 102, 119, 131.
16. Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1, at 62-63.
17. Id. at 133-137.
18. See generally id.
19. See generally id.

20. Id. at 133-149.
21. Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1,at 136.
22. Id. 138.
23. Id.
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the left. Moreover, when one examines the data for legal stability (the decision to
overturn precedent), the most activist justices are contemporary conservative justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy. 2 4
While the book is an exemplar of careful and transparent research, I am left with a
few questions. First, I found the overlap between ideology and activism puzzling.
Specifically, even though the authors are careful to control for judicial preferences, the
justices who occupy more centrist positions on the Court tend to be moderate in their
activism as well. Theoretically, these two concepts should be separate. I am not sure
what to make of this finding and I hoped for the authors to discuss this in more detail.
I am also somewhat skeptical of the authors' decision to create a composite
measure of judicial activism. In their final empirical chapter they create an additive scale
of the individual activism measures (willingness to overturn federal laws, state laws,
executive agency decisions, overturning of precedent, and institutional
aggrandizement).25 Their justification for the ranking is that since each is measured on a
similar scale (percent activist), they can be aggregated by simply adding them together. 26
My concern is that the measure may not perfectly reflect the difference in the frequencies
with which these different activities occur. For example, overturning state laws happens
with greater frequency than overturning federal laws or reversing precedent. Therefore,
one may wonder whether it is appropriate to accord them equal weight in the composite
measure. Moreover, one might also question whether the decision to overturn precedent
is capturing something different. The results for this measure seem to differ from the
results for the other measures.
In the chapter on overturning precedent, the authors acknowledge that some
justices have provided principled explanations for why overturning precedent is not
equivalent to judicial activism.27 In particular, they point to Justices Douglas and
Thomas (among others) who have both argued, from different ends of the ideological
continuum, that current justices need not be bound by precedent in all circumstances. 2 8
While I agree that adherence to precedent is part of the Court's institutional legitimacy
and thus is appropriate to include as a measure of activism, the empirical results suggest
that it is somewhat different than the other measures. Thus, while I appreciate the desire
to create a single measure of judicial activism, I think this aggregate measure just needs
more justification.
Finally, the research does not provide a theoretical account of judicial activism. To
be fair, the authors do not claim to be doing so, and are much more interested in the
empirical question. I am confident that this book will generate further research toward
developing a theoretical framework for understanding judicial activism and restraint. In
particular, further research might pursue an explanation for variation between the justices
in their inclination to engage in activist behaviors. Do presidents gage not only a
nominee's ideology but also her willingness to assert that agenda? Is activism driven by

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 131.
Id. at 133-149.
Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1, at 137.
Id. at 123-125.
Id.
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the larger political context? Research aimed at these questions might help situate the
study of judicial activism in larger theoretical debates regarding the nature of judicial
decision making and the role of separation of powers in constraining judicial behavior.
These minor questions aside, this book is a fantastic addition to the literature on
judicial decision making. The authors devise a clever and pleasingly simple empirical
strategy to study judicial activism - undoubtedly a topic that is one of the most important
subjects of inquiry for scholars of law and courts. The results are quite interesting and
will, I fully expect, inform scholars about the different dimensions of judicial activism as
well as the variation between courts and justices over time.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES AND EXPECTATIONS FOR JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR

Turning to the second book included in this review essay, Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations, James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira examine American attitudes
toward the confirmation of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. 29 The research presented
in this book builds upon years of research on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court by
extending their theories to the confirmation process. The main findings for this book
come from an impressive three-wave panel study of a nationally representative sample of
Americans on their perceptions of Samuel Alito during the confirmation process and
how the confirmation process affected institutional support for the Supreme Court.30 The
a theory they have
book first elaborates their theory of institutional legitimacy
developed and refined in their work together and with other collaborators. 3 1 The central
part of that research has been the development of what they call positivity theory.32
According to positivity theory, "anything that causes people to pay attention to courts
even controversies winds up reinforcing institutional legitimacy through exposure to
the legitimizing symbols associated with law and courts." 3 3 The main prediction of
positivity theory "is that legal controversies tend to reinforce judicial legitimacy by
teaching the lesson that courts are different from the other institutions of the American
democracy, and are therefore worthy of respect." 34
In the first chapter of the book, they elaborate upon positivity theory as well as
their general theory on institutional legitimacy. 35 Importantly, they impress upon the
reader the utility of studying public opinion toward Supreme Court nominees. 36
Although the public does not vote on nominees, confirmation hearings have become
increasingly public affairs and Americans are becoming increasingly attentive to
confirmation battles. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that confirmation politics
are an important ingredient in the overall level of institutional legitimacy of the Supreme
Court. The second chapter examines public awareness of the Supreme Court and
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5.
Id.
Id. at 1-10.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 3.
Id. at 1-16.
Id. at 12-14.
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effectively dispels the conventional wisdom that the public is woefully ignorant about
the Supreme Court. 37 The findings here go a long way toward establishing the relevance
of research on public attitudes toward a Supreme Court. The third chapter includes an
overview of their work developing this theory.38 For those unfamiliar with the work on
institutional legitimacy, diffuse/specific support, and the role of democratic values in
explaining support for the Court, this chapter is essential reading for understanding the
theoretical arguments presented in the later chapters.
The heart of the book can be found in Chapters 4 and 5.39 It is in these chapters
that the authors turn to examining the Alito confirmation itself and how the politics of
the confirmation affected the Court's institutional legitimacy. 40 Here, the authors
describe the confirmation battle, including the unprecedented public campaign waged by
various interest groups to sway public opinion in support or opposition to the nominee.
They describe that campaign as a battle of frames. 4 1 Those opposed to Alito attempted to
that he was outside of the ideological
frame his nomination in ideological terms
mainstream and too intemperate to serve on the Supreme Court.42 According to Gibson
and Caldeira, Alito's opponents were not successful in overcoming the 'judiciousness"
frame advocated by his supporters which instead focused on Alito's technical and legal
qualifications. 4 3 Although they introduce a number of hypotheses, the central hypothesis
is that "preexisting institutional loyalty plays a crucial role in how people perceive and
judge confirmation processes" and that
institutional loyalty interacts with events surrounding the confirmation, leading citizens
with a sense of loyalty toward the Court to rely primarily upon criteria of judiciousness in
judging the nominee. In contrast, those without a sense of institutional loyalty are likely to
judge the confirmation process largely in terms of ordinary political criteria.
Before they evaluate that hypothesis, they first evaluate how the public perceived
Alito. 4 5 Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of respondents found Alito to be fairly
similar to them ideologically.46 Gibson and Caldeira maintain that this represents the
"opposition's abject failure at portraying Alito as excessively and illegitimately
conservative. "47 They also find that the majority of respondents were "reasonably
satisfied" with Alito's judicial temperament. 4 8
An interesting note is that in creating their measure of "judiciousness," Gibson and
Caldeira include one item tapping into the idea of stare decisis. 49 Specifically, one

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 17-35.
Id. at 36-62.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 63-120.
Id
Id.
Id
Id. at 124.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 70.
Id. at 71-85.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 80.
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50
question asks how important it is for judges to respect existing precedent. Respondents
attach much less weight to upholding precedent than many other items in their overall
index of judiciousness. 5 1 In fact, only 37.3 percent of their respondents felt that this is
"very important" whereas 75.5 percent rated fairness and impartiality as "very
important." 52 Thus, as with the Lindquist and Cross book, adherence to precedent may
not fit in with other indicators of activism and judiciousness. In Lindquist and Cross, the
results for activism on overturning precedent differed from the results for activism on the
other indicators. 5 3 In Gibson and Caldeira's book, the public is surprisingly less adherent
to the idea of stare decisis than one might expect given the public rhetoric about it. 54 I
think this may indicate a need to consider whether overturning of precedent is simply not
analogous to other measures of judicial activism and whether it carries the same
rhetorical baggage in public debates. At the very least, it suggests that neither the public
nor the justices view it as the same as other behaviors.
In their analysis of confirmation preferences, Gibson and Caldeira find that
judiciousness outweighs the partisan and ideological considerations. 5 5 Both are
important, as one might expect, but consistent with their hypothesis judiciousness counts
more.56 Moreover, when institutional loyalty is added to the analysis, they find support
for their central hypothesis. 57 Those who were higher on institutional loyalty were more
likely to weigh judiciousness in their evaluation than were those lower on preexisting
institutional loyalty. 58 The findings in this chapter are carefully analyzed and the authors
go to great lengths to rule out alternative explanations.
Finally, in Chapter 5, Gibson and Caldeira examine whether the confirmation
process affected institutional support for the Supreme Court. 59 The authors hypothesize
the politicized nature of the process outside of the Senate could have a corrosive effect
on institutional legitimacy. 6 0 The authors effectively demonstrate that interest groups'
advertisements during the Alito confirmation - even those in support of Alito- were all
political in tone. 6 1 The result was that exposure to these ads decreased the Court's
63
legitimacy.62 On the other hand attention to the confirmation battle itself did not.
Presumably, watching the Senate confirmation process was more civil and emphasized
the legal nature of the Court and thus served to reinforce institutional legitimacy. Gibson
and Caldeira conclude that while institutional legitimacy is usually an enduring quality,
the politicization of the confirmation process by interest group advertisements threatens

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 80-81.
Id
Id
See Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 80-81.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id
Id. at 93-95.
Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 96-120.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 113.
Id
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the legitimacy of the Court.64 Moreover, these results endured for some time. This
finding is especially important given that their own prior research suggested that Court's
legitimacy did not suffer appreciably in the wake of Bush v. Gore.6 5 This suggests that
the recent involvement in interest group activity for confirmations poses more of a threat
than even the most controversial Court actions. It is also clear that interest group activity
on confirmations is not likely to wane in the near future.
Overall, the research in this book is exceptional and should be considered required
reading for scholars of the American judiciary. The research design a multiple-wave
panel-study of a representative sample of American citizens - is truly unique and enables
the authors to make generalizable claims as well as being able to pin-point the causal
dynamics. At the same time, some critics might note that this is a study of a single
confirmation and thus, may not be generalizable to other confirmations. While this may
limit the findings somewhat, the authors were presented with an ideal nominee. Since
Alito was so polarizing, his confirmation provided a strong case against which to test
their positivity hypothesis and the effect of judiciousness frames. The controversy
surrounding Alito works against their hypotheses. Moreover, many of their findings are
not just about Alito himself, but also about what Americans generally expect of their
judicial nominees. That being said, it should be noted that this kind of research design is
incredibly costly to implement. Future research might consider smaller scale designs to
assess how other kinds of nominees and other kinds of political advertisements affect
confirmation attitudes as well as institutional legitimacy.
Although the two books reviewed in this essay ask different questions and use very
different research strategies, they share much in common. Taken together, these two
books contribute a great deal of insight into the nature of judicial activism as well as how
perceptions of judicial behavior can affect the confirmation of future Supreme Court
justices. Both books note the importance of the judicial role. In the Lindquist and Cross
book, the questions are about the extent to which judges express their role of judicial
activism/restraint in their voting behavior.66 Underlying the research is the often heated
normative debate concerning the counter-majoritarian problem. Although Lindquist and
Cross remain agnostic about the normative questions, they correctly note that many other
observers of the Court perceive activism negatively. I think it is safe to say that no
public official has ever praised a nominee or a judge for being an "activist." Similarly,
Caldeira and Gibson also do not weigh in with their view of what makes for an ideal
nominee or whether Alito satisfies their own expectations of judiciousness. 6 8 However,
their research is steeped in the assumption that the American public has views about
what makes a judicious nominee, and one of those views is that judges ought not to
assert themselves politically, or in other ways to "legislate from the bench."69 Although
Gibson and Caldeira's notions of judiciousness do not map perfectly onto the indicators
of judicial activism in Lindquist and Cross, there is considerable overlap in the general
64. Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5, at 119-120.
65. Id. at 144-151.
66. See Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
67. Id.

68. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5.
69. Id. at81.
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ideas.70 Thus, they both note that activism is something that the American public dislikes
and that members of the Senate exploit this in their rhetorical campaigns in support of or
opposed to nominees. 7 1
The Lindquist and Cross book starts with the premise that charges of judicial
activism are levied by those who disagree with the likely politics of judicial nominees,
but that beyond that, the accusation is not a principled one. 72 Democrats are suspicious
of the activism of Republican nominees but not Democratic nominees, and vice-versa.
Gibson and Caldeira's work is less pessimistic. Although there were clear partisan
divisions over support for Alito's confirmation, many were still willing to perceive Alito
as meeting their expectations of what a judge should do, and while the interest group
activity surrounding the confirmation eroded support for the Court, the confirmation
process itself did not. Only time will tell whether interest groups are better able to mount
attacks on a nominee's judiciousness and more effectively frame the confirmation
process. I think this research suggest that if they focus more on a nominee's legal and
technical qualifications, they might be more successful in affecting confirmation
preferences. In sum, both books are terrific examples of first rate empirical scholarship
by political scientists addressing questions of interest to political scientists, legal
scholars, and one would hope, those responsible for selecting and confirming judges to
our national courts.

70. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5; Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
71. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra n. 5; Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
72. See Lindquist & Cross, supra n. 1.
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